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Block (2002) has argued that the multiplicity of meanings ascribed to consciousness is due 
to the erroneous treatment of very different concepts as a single concept. Block distinguished 
four notions of consciousness intended to encapsulate the various meanings attributed to 
the term: phenomenal, access, self, and monitoring consciousness. We argue that what is 
common to all of these definitions is the implicit distinction between consciousness and the 
content of consciousness. We critically examine the term “altered state of consciousness” 
and argue that affixing the qualifier “altered state” to consciousness results in a theoretical 
confusion of consciousness and its content, that is, consciousness is mistaken for the con-
tent of consciousness. We refer to this as the consciousness/content fallacy and argue that 
it may be avoided if one supplants “altered states of consciousness” with “altered pattern of 
phenomenal properties,” an extrapolation of the term “phenomenal field.” Implications of 
the consciousness/content fallacy for theory and research are also considered.
Chalmers (1995) suggested that, “There is nothing we know more intimately than consciousness, but there is nothing harder to explain” (p. 200). 
Although psychologists and philosophers of mind are 
engaged in intricate debate over the concept of “con-
sciousness” (e.g., Antony, 2002; Block, 1995; Chalmers, 
1996, 2002; Lormand, 1996; Natsoulas, 1978, 1983; 
Rosenthal, 2002; Silby, 1998), there exists a lacuna in 
the literature with regards to a critical analysis of the 
distinction between consciousness and the content of 
consciousness inherent in definitions of the term con-
sciousness and the intimately-related so-called “state” 
of consciousness. Similarly, scholars have neglected to 
delineate the kind of fallacious reasoning whereby a 
shift from the key definitional elements of the term con-
sciousness to states of consciousness is accompanied by 
a theoretical confusion of consciousness and the content 
of consciousness. We refer to this as the consciousness/
content fallacy.
 The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the 
aforementioned fallacy and provide an attempt at resolu-
tion. We proceed by reviewing numerous definitions of 
consciousness and argue that they all exemplify a com-
monality with regards to the implicit distinction between 
consciousness and the content of consciousness. Secondly, 
the consciousness/content fallacy is explicated through an 
analysis of the concept of states of consciousness. Finally, 
the consciousness/content fallacy is examined with 
reference to the concept of “altered states of consciousness” 
and, subsequently, a solution to the fallacy is proposed. 
 It is noteworthy that there exist instances in 
which the key definitional elements of the term con-
sciousness are held to be conscious awareness and uncon-
scious functioning (Krippner, 1972) or simply conscious 
awareness, attention, and memory (Farthing, 1992). The 
present paper, however, is concerned with the concept of 
consciousness as the “cognizor” of objects (e.g., internal 
and external events) and the fallacy that occurs when 
a shift from the term consciousness to states of con-
sciousness is accompanied by a confusion of conscious-
ness with the content of consciousness. Consequently, 
for the purpose of the present paper, only the conscious 
awareness component of the concept of consciousness 
will be considered. 
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Consciousness and Content
 Forman (1996) stated that the inherent difficulty 
associated with providing an adequate definition of con-
sciousness is due in part to the multiplicity of meanings 
ascribed to the term. Block (2002) suggested that this mul-
tiplicity of meanings is due to the erroneous treatment of 
very different concepts as a single concept. For example, 
in an influential series of articles Block (e.g., 1995, 2002) 
distinguished a number of notions of consciousness: phe-
nomenal, access, self, and monitoring consciousness.
 Block (2002, p. 206) stated that phenomenal 
consciousness (p-consciousness) refers to one being aware 
of “experiential properties of sensations, feelings and per-
ceptions...thoughts, wants and emotions.” In contrast, 
access-consciousness (a-consciousness) is a non-phenom-
enal notion of consciousness. An entity exemplifying a-
consciousness is one who is aware of information “poised 
for direct rational control of action” (Silby, 1998, p. 3). 
Block (2002) suggested that self-consciousness (s-con-
sciousness) is illustrated by “me-ishness.” An s-conscious 
entity is one that is aware of the concept of the self and 
that one’s usage of this concept (explicitly or implicitly) 
in thinking about oneself also reveals s-consciousness. 
Consciousness may also be conceptualized as an internal 
monitor, that is, monitoring consciousness (m-conscious-
ness). Block suggested that an entity may be m-conscious 
of inner perceptions, internal scanning, and metacogni-
tive thoughts resulting in entering a particular cognitive 
state. 
 A commonality exemplified by the preceding 
notions of consciousness is that, “When people are 
conscious, they are always conscious of something. 
Consciousness always has an object” (Benjafield, 1992, 
p. 58).2 For example, one may be p-conscious of phe-
nomenal properties, a-conscious of information that 
may be invoked to control actions, s-conscious of one’s 
self-concept, or m-conscious of, for example, internal 
scanning. Benjafield’s contention is by no means novel. 
Indeed, over a century ago Husserl argued that, “All 
consciousness…is consciousness of something” (cited in 
Sartre, 1958, p. Ii). Similarly, Sartre himself asserted that 
consciousness always attends to a “transcendent object” 
and is thereby precluded from being phenomenologically 
contentless (p. 629). Sartre referred to this type of con-
sciousness as “positional self-consciousness.” Sartre stated 
that:
All that there is of intention in my actual conscious-
ness is directed toward the outside, toward the table; 
all my judgments or practical activities, all my present 
inclinations transcend themselves; they aim at the 
table and are absorbed in it. Not all consciousness 
is knowledge (there are states of affective conscious-
ness, for example), but all knowing consciousness 
can be knowledge only of its object. (p. Iii)
 A survey of the cognitive psychology literature 
further supports Benjafield’s (1992) contention. In brief, 
cognitive psychologists (e.g., Matlin, 1998; Nairne, 1997; 
Solso, 2001) tend to define consciousness as the awareness 
of internal and external events (e.g., mental phenomena 
and stimuli in the environment, respectively). In contrast, 
others limit the definitional boundary of conscious-
ness to “the subjective awareness of mental events” (e.g., 
Westen, 1999, p. G-4). It is arguable that these assertions 
constitute the core of consciousness concepts in cognitive 
psychology today. Commenting on the definition of 
consciousness as being aware of something, Natsoulas 
(1978) wrote: “It is arguably our most basic concept of 
consciousness, for it is implicated in all the other senses” 
(p. 910). 
 The salient point exemplified by the preceding 
descriptions of consciousness is the distinction between 
consciousness and the content of consciousness. For 
example, Block’s (2002) phenomenal consciousness is 
not composed of experiential properties such as sensa-
tions and perceptions (contents of p-consciousness), but 
rather refers to one being p-conscious of experiential prop-
erties such as sensations and perceptions.
Confusing Consciousness and Content
 As stated above, consciousness is often defined 
as awareness of internal and external events (e.g., Matlin, 
1998; Nairne, 1997; Solso, 2001) or merely awareness of 
something (e.g., Natsoulas, 1978). In contrast, a so-called 
state of consciousness (SoC) tends to be defined as “[the 
set] of mental episodes of which one can readily become 
directly aware” (p. 912). While definitions of conscious-
ness typically distinguish consciousness from the content 
of consciousness, the preceding definition of SoCs rep-
resents a theoretical confusion of consciousness and its 
contents by explicitly stating that a SoC is the content 
(i.e., mental episodes) available to conscious awareness. 
That is, when the qualifier “state” is affixed to conscious-
ness, “it” [consciousness] is held to be content. Conse-
quently, the term states of consciousness rests on a confla-
tion of consciousness and content whereby consciousness 
is erroneously categorized in terms of content rendered 
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perceptible, presumably, by itself. Again, we refer to this 
as the consciousness/content fallacy. 
 Implicit in the consciousness/content fallacy is 
the fallacious notion that during a SoC, consciousness 
may observe its own qualities. For example, a privi-
leged observer would only be conscious of the fact that 
he or she was experiencing a particular SoC (i.e., that 
consciousness exemplified state-like properties), if con-
sciousness could observe its own properties. However, 
one cannot directly experience the conscious awareness 
process, CA1, which functions to render an object per-
ceptible because this would require the postulation of a 
second conscious awareness process, CA2, necessary to 
render CA1 a perceptible object, thus, committing one 
to a vicious regress. 
 Furthermore, others (e.g., Feinberg, 2001; Kant, 
1781/1933; Vasu, 1979) have argued that consciousness 
cannot directly experience “itself” as a perceptible object, 
for then it would cease to be the subject.3 Wilber (1993) 
stated that the circumstance is analogous to a sword that 
cannot cut itself, an eye that cannot see itself, a tongue 
that cannot taste itself, or a finger that cannot touch its 
own tip. This argument has been reiterated in Baladeva’s 
commentary to the Vedanta sutras of Badarayana in which 
he wrote, “If the Self could perceive His own properties, 
He could also perceive Himself; which is absurd, since 
one and the same thing cannot be both the agent and the 
object of an action” (Vasu, 1979, p. 331). Similarly, in the 
Brihadaranyaka-Upanishad it is stated that, “You cannot 
see the seer of sight, you cannot hear the hearer of sound, 
you cannot think the thinker of the thought, you cannot 
know the knower of the known” (Swami & Yeats, 1970, 
p. 138). As Kant (1781/1933) argued:
I cannot know as an object that which I must presup-
pose in order to know any object, and that the deter-
mining self (the thought) is distinguished from the 
self that is to be determined (the thinking subject) in 
the same way that knowledge is distinguished from 
its object. (p. 365)
 A variant of the consciousness/content fallacy 
may be found in Pekala’s (1991) statement that, “By 
consciousness I mean one’s awareness of one’s subjec-
tive experience, including both the processes of being 
aware and the various contents of the awareness” (p. 
1). That is, Pekala contended that consciousness is both 
“one’s awareness of one’s subjective experience” and “the 
various contents of the awareness” (p. 1). Consequently, 
rather than committing the consciousness/content fallacy 
via a movement from a definition of consciousness to a 
definition of SoCs, Pekala has implicitly conflated con-
sciousness and content within the context of a single 
definition.
The Consciousness/Content Fallacy with Reference 
to Altered States of Consciousness
 During the formative stages of humanistic and 
transpersonal psychology, Ludwig (1969), Krippner 
(1972), and Tart (1969) made contributions regarding 
the formulation of operational definitions pertaining 
to the concept of altered states of consciousness (ASCs). 
Decades later such definitions are still held by many to 
constitute the standard. 
 Ludwig (1969) defined an ASC as 
any mental state(s), induced by various physiological, 
psychological, or pharmacological manoeuvres or 
agents, which can be recognized subjectively by the 
individual himself (or by an objective observer of the 
individual) as representing a sufficient deviation in 
subjective experience or psychological functioning 
from certain general norms for that individual during 
alert, waking consciousness. (pp. 9-10)
Unfortunately, Ludwig’s definition fails to clarify 
precisely what constitutes a “sufficient deviation in sub-
jective experience” (pp. 9-10). Furthermore, the “general 
norms” held to be associated with normal waking con-
sciousness are neither outlined nor explained.
 In contrast to Ludwig (1969), Krippner (1972) 
has formulated a definition of ASCs that circumvents the 
problems associated with operationalizing the qualifying 
term “sufficient.” Krippner (1972) defined an ASC as 
a mental state which can be subjectively recognized 
by an individual (or by an objective observer of the 
individual) as representing a difference in psycholog-
ical functioning from the individual’s ‘normal’ alert 
state. (p. 1)
Correspondingly, Tart (1969) defined an ASC for a given 
individual as one in which the person experiences a 
qualitative shift in his pattern of mental functioning, 
that is, he feels not just a quantitative shift (more 
or less alert, more or less visual imagery, sharper or 
duller, etc.), but also that some quality or qualities of 
his mental processes are different. (p. 1)
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Examples of qualities may include visual hallucinations, 
alterations in space-time perception, reductions in dis-
cursive thought, and the dissolution of one’s sense of 
self, and it can be argued that Tart’s (1969) decision to 
include both quantitative and qualitative differences in 
cognitive functioning within the definitional boundaries 
of ASCs renders his formulation of the concept superior 
to Krippner’s (1972) attempt at operationalization.
 It is noteworthy that the preceding definitions 
postulate that it is the shifts, deviations, or differences 
in subjective experience (Ludwig, 1969), psychological 
functioning (Krippner, 1972), or mental functioning 
(Tart, 1969) that constitute an ASC.  If one accepts the 
definition of an ASC as shifts, deviations, or differences 
in subjective experience, psychological functioning, or 
mental functioning, then it would seem to follow that 
ordinary consciousness is the baseline subjective experi-
ence, psychological functioning, or mental functioning. 
Furthermore, if an ASC did constitute the shifts, devia-
tions, or differences in subjective experience, psycholog-
ical functioning, or mental functioning, then a privileged 
observer would not be conscious of such shifts on the 
grounds that to be conscious of such shifts would neces-
sitate that consciousness could observe changes in its own 
properties, that is, alterations held to constitute an ASC. 
Ludwig (1969), Krippner (1972), and Tart (1969) none-
theless emphasize that an ASC may be subjectively rec-
ognized by a privileged observer. Consequently, if these 
authors are using ASC as a subsidiary part of the notion of 
consciousness as one being conscious of something (e.g., 
an internal or external event), then they have confused 
consciousness and the content of consciousness on the 
grounds that consciousness is implicitly held to be both: 
(1) the cognizor of shifts in subjective experience, and (2) 
the shifts in subjective experience. If ASC is not being 
used as a subsidiary part of the aforementioned notion of 
consciousness, then the definition of consciousness that 
has been used to extrapolate a definition for ASC needs 
to be explicitly stated.
  If one accepts the definition of consciousness 
as being conscious of something, then it would seem to 
follow that during an ASC it is the phenomenal proper-
ties that consciousness may be aware of that are altered 
(e.g., visual mental imagery, body image, time sense), 
rather than the state of consciousness. It is arguable, 
however, that phenomenal properties do not encapsulate 
the variety of mental phenomena that may be objectified 
by consciousness. For example, as previously discussed, 
Block (2002) formulated the notion of access-conscious-
ness whereby an entity is held to be conscious of non-
phenomenal mental objects: information primed for the 
rational control of one’s actions (Silby, 1998). Similarly, 
O’Brien and Opie (1997) suggested that “phenomenal 
experience” does not refer to objects associated with self-
consciousness and access-consciousness (e.g., self-concept 
and information that may be invoked to control actions, 
respectively), but rather the “what is it like?” of experi-
ence (p. 269). For the purpose of this paper, however, 
Reber and Reber’s (2001) definition of phenomenal field 
as “absolutely anything that is in the total momentary 
experiencing of a person, including the experience of the 
self” (p. 532) is adopted and applied to “phenomenal 
properties.” It is arguable that if one defines phenomenal 
properties in this way, then an altered pattern of phe-
nomenal properties encapsulates what has been referred 
to by Block (1995) and others (e.g., Lormand, 1996) as 
phenomenal and non-phenomenal objects of conscious 
awareness, that is, the content that a privileged observer 
may be aware of during what Krippner (1972), Ludwig 
(1969), and Tart (1969) referred to as an ASC.4 One 
may then recommend that the term altered state of con-
sciousness be supplanted by a new term, “altered pattern 
of phenomenal properties.”5, 6 It would seem that by 
reconceptualizing the notion of an ASC in this manner, 
the confusion of consciousness with the content of con-
sciousness is avoided.7
 The wide applicability of our proposed solution 
to the consciousness/content fallacy may be exemplified 
with respect to shamanic research. While the key defini-
tional elements of the term “shamanic states of conscious-
ness” are somewhat contentious, it is generally held that 
an integral feature of such states is the presence of highly 
organized, multi-modal (e.g., visual, auditory, gustatory, 
tactile) mental imagery that is consistent with a shamanic 
cosmology (e.g., Houran, Lange & Crist-Houran, 1997; 
Noll, 1983, 1985; Walsh, 1995). For instance, as an exper-
imental participant’s shamanic journey to the “lower 
world” progresses, extraneous visual mental images (i.e., 
distracting thoughts) may be supplanted by visual mental 
images of, for example, anthropomorphous spirit helpers, 
rivers, and predatory creatures. It is the qualitative altera-
tion of visual mental images, rather than consciousness 
“itself,” that contributes to a privileged observer’s (i.e., 
an experimental participant) subjective recognition that 
a particular state is shamanic. Consequently, it would 
seem more appropriate to speak of shamanic patterns of 
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phenomenal properties rather than a shamanic state of 
consciousness.
Conclusion
 This paper reviews numerous definitions of 
the term consciousness and argues that they all share 
the implicit distinction between consciousness and the 
content of consciousness. It is further suggested that 
definitions of the terms states of consciousness and 
altered states of consciousness erroneously conflate con-
sciousness and content by explicitly defining SoCs as 
the content (i.e., mental episodes) available to conscious 
awareness. That is, when the qualifier “state” is affixed to 
consciousness, “it” [consciousness] is held to be content. 
This is referred to as the consciousness/content fallacy. It 
is also contended that the consciousness/content fallacy 
is avoided if one reconceptualizes an ASC as an altered 
pattern of phenomenal properties. Finally, the wide appli-
cability of our proposed solution to the consciousness/
content fallacy is illustrated with respect to shamanic 
research. 
 The consciousness/content fallacy has numerous 
theoretical implications. Theories of ASCs, for example, 
would be enhanced by supplanting the term altered 
states of consciousness with altered patterns of phe-
nomenal properties. Theories containing the conscious-
ness/content fallacy would need to be revised to avoid 
fallacious contentions such as consciousness is simulta-
neously: (1) the cognizor of shifts in, for instance, sub-
jective experience, and (2) the shifts in subjective expe-
rience themselves. If a particular ASC theory did not 
incorporate the term altered states of consciousness as a 
subsidiary of the concept of consciousness as conscious 
awareness of something, then this would need to be 
explicitly stated. Fundamentally, ASC theories would 
need to be reformulated such that the phenomenon being 
explained is alterations in phenomenal properties rather 
than consciousness. 
 In addition, the consciousness/content fallacy 
has implications for quantitative and qualitative 
research. A researcher who is cognizant of this fallacy 
and wishes to develop a survey instrument to quanti-
tatively measure, for example, meditation experiences, 
would construct items pertaining to alterations in 
phenomenal properties, rather than alterations in con-
sciousness.8 For instance, items such as “I experienced 
an extremely unusual state of consciousness” would be 
omitted in favor of items addressing a range of phenom-
enal properties (e.g., “My subjective time sense seemed 
to slow down,” “My visual imagery became extremely 
vivid,” “I felt great joy”). Similarly, consider a research 
situation in which, for example, an existential-phenom-
enological study of shamanic journeying experiences 
is conducted using semi-structured interviews for the 
purpose of obtaining non-numerical data that may be 
organized into comprehensive constituent themes. A 
researcher who is mindful of the consciousness/content 
fallacy would not pose open-ended questions about 
shamanic states of consciousness or alterations in con-
sciousness. Instead open-ended questions pertaining to 
phenomenal properties would be asked (e.g., “Can you 
please tell me about the visual mental images that you 
encountered during your last journeying experience?”). 
We hope that this elucidation and proposed resolution 
of the consciousness/content fallacy will encourage con-
sciousness theoreticians and researchers from diverse 
backgrounds to address its implications. 
Endnotes
1.  The authors wish to thank the Chair for the Study of 
Consciousness, Saybrook Graduate School and Research 
Center, for its support of this paper.
2. One notable exception is an unmediated form of mystical 
experience referred to as the pure consciousness event 
(PCE) (e.g., Almond, 1982; Bucknell, 1989a; Franklin, 
1990; Kessler & Prigge, 1982; Matt, 1990; Perovich, 1990; 
Prigge & Kessler, 1990; Rothberg, 1990; Woodhouse, 
1990). Forman (1990a) defined the PCE as “a wakeful 
though contentless (nonintentional) consciousness” (p. 
8). A substantial body of evidence has been produced to 
support this claim. For example, Chapple (1990) reported 
that descriptions of kaivalyam in the Samkhya system and 
samadhi in the Yoga Sutras are suggestive of the “attainment 
of a purified consciousness that is beyond characterization” 
(p. 70). Griffiths (1990) surveyed the Indian Buddhist 
tradition and found evidence for a condition referred to 
as the attainment of cessation (nirodhasamapatti), which 
is defined as “the non-occurrence of mind and mental 
concomitants” (p. 78). Bucknell (1989b) suggested that 
the “third non-material jhana” encountered in Buddhist 
meditation is analogous to the introvertive mystical experi-
ence “in which both the thought-stream and sensory input 
have ceased, leaving zero mental content” (p. 19). Forman 
(1990b) examined the mystical theology of the Christian 
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mystic Meister Eckhart and concluded that Eckhart con-
sidered encounters with the Godhead to be “phenomeno-
logically contentless” (p. 112). 
3.  For the purpose of the present paper, consciousness is not 
considered a subject in the literal sense of a thing that 
attends to objects, but rather a process of subjectivity 
that renders objects perceptible.
4.  It is not uncommon for scholars to use the term “phe-
nomenal” or “phenomenological” to denote objects that, 
for example, Block (1995) would categorize as non-phe-
nomenal. For example, Pekala’s (1991) use of the term 
“phenomenological experience” includes phenomena that 
Block would consider associated with self-consciousness 
(e.g., one’s self as an object of consciousness).
5.  It is arguable that because we are delimiting our consid-
eration of the concept of consciousness to the conscious 
awareness component of consciousness, the term altered 
pattern of phenomenal properties should be qualified and 
replaced with conscious awareness of an altered pattern of 
phenomenal properties. However, the qualifier conscious 
awareness is superfluous because it is implicit in the key 
definitional elements of the term “phenomenal” as derived 
from the term “phenomenal field” (i.e., “absolutely 
anything that is in the total momentary experiencing of 
a person, including the experience of the self ” (Reber & 
Reber, 2001, p. 532). Specifically, it may be argued that 
this “total momentary experiencing of a person” (p. 532) 
implies conscious awareness.
6.  A pattern of phenomenal properties is held to be altered 
relative to a baseline pattern of phenomenal properties, 
that is, what is traditionally referred to as normal waking 
consciousness or an ordinary waking state. One may use, 
for example, a retrospective phenomenological assessment 
instrument referred to as the Phenomenology of Con-
sciousness Inventory (PCI; Pekala, 1991) to investigate 
patterns of phenomenal properties. In fact, the PCI is held 
to quantify “both the major contents of consciousness, and 
the processes or means by which these contents are ‘illumi-
nated,’ cognized, perceived, and so forth by consciousness” 
(Pekala, 1991, p. 82). The former is denoted by our use 
of the term phenomenal properties. The PCI consists of 
12 major dimensions (e.g., positive effect, visual imagery, 
rationality) and 14 minor dimensions (e.g., fear, joy, 
altered body image). Each dimension is scored on a seven-
point Likert scale where 0 denotes no or little increased 
intensity values and 6 denotes much or complete (Pekala & 
Wenger, 1983; Pekala, Wenger, & Levine, 1985). The PCI 
possesses adequate psychometric properties. For example, 
Pekala, Steinberg, and Kumar (1986) reported coefficient 
alphas between .70 and .90 for all dimensions, suggesting 
that the PCI has a good internal consistency. In support of 
the scale’s criterion validity, Pekala, Steinberg, and Kumar 
found that subjects exposed to different stimulus condi-
tions received significantly different PCI scores. One may 
use the PCI data to construct graphs referred to as psygrams 
that diagram the patterns of relationships between pairs 
of phenomenal properties derived from a squared covari-
ance matrix pertaining to a particular stimulus condition 
(Pekala, 1991). Previous research has used the PCI to inves-
tigate whether, for example, the phenomenology of trance 
postures is statistically significantly altered relative to a 
baseline stimulus condition of sitting quietly with eyes open 
(Woodside, Kumar & Pekala, 1997). Pekala, Wenger, and 
Levine (1985) also used sitting quietly with eyes open as 
their control condition, arguing that it elicits phenomenal 
properties congruent with normal waking consciousness.  
7.  Clearly, such logic may be extended to other states of 
consciousness. For example, the term shamanic states of 
consciousness may be replaced by a shamanic pattern of 
phenomenal properties, Buddhist states (e.g., jhanas) of 
consciousness by a Buddhist pattern of phenomenal prop-
erties, yogic states (e.g., samadhi) of consciousness by a 
yogic pattern of phenomenal properties, and so on.
8.  Similarly, Krippner and Meacham (1968) have suggested 
that “it may make more sense to speak of the ‘objects’ of 
consciousness than to speak of the ‘states’ of consciousness” 
(p. 150). It is noteworthy, however, that this recommenda-
tion was not arrived at via a recognition of the conscious-
ness/content fallacy, but rather the methodological diffi-
culties associated with searching for a particular state – or 
altered state – of consciousness. For example, Krippner and 
Meacham (1968) asserted that:
The concept of “altered states of consciousness” would 
be valid if each state brought about similar subjective 
reports and similar neurophysiological reactions on the 
part of most individuals. With the exception of sleep 
and dream states, and with the possible exception of the 
“alpha state,” these subjective and objective similarities 
have not been consistently noted. (pp. 149-150)
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